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Protecting citizens against the financial
consequences of illness has long been a key
objective of health systems worldwide. In
the United Kingdom for example, finan-
cial protection—which refers to how far
people are protected from the financial
consequences of illness—was the funda-
mental goal when the National Health
Service was established in 1948, more
than health improvement or equitable
access to health care [1]. The World
Health Report 2000 identified financial
protection against the costs of ill health as
a fundamental objective of health systems,
on the basis of the premise that a fair
health system ensures households make
health care payments according to their
ability to pay rather than risk of illness [2].
This report helped put financial protection
at the forefront of health policy and
academic debates, leading to numerous
studies concerned with identifying the
determinants of financial protection levels
[3].
Ten years later, the World Health
Report 2010 called on all countries to
take concrete steps towards achieving
universal health coverage, defined as
providing all people with access to needed
health services of sufficient quality to be
effective, without financial hardship asso-
ciated with their use [4,5]. This call was
made because most health systems still fail
to offer adequate financial protection
because of insufficient financial risk pool-
ing and prepayment mechanisms. Finan-
cial risk pooling involves the collection and
management of health revenues from all
members of the pool, such that the risk
related to health care payment is borne
collectively rather than from each individ-
ual contributor. Health systems with
higher prepaid funds for health care—that
is, funds paid by individuals before the
event of illness, through social health
insurance contributions or taxes—are
likely to enhance financial protection by
favoring effective spreading of financial
risk across all population groups (see Box 1
for a definition of key concepts). Financial
hardship due to medical payments has
been estimated to affect 150 million people
globally each year, in both richer and
poorer countries [6]. Affected individuals
face a great risk of being driven into
poverty because of health care expenses,
resulting also in lack of access to needed
care owing to inability to pay. Neverthe-
less, the squeeze on public finances asso-
ciated with the global economic downturn
has led some governments (e.g., Spain and
Greece) to increase direct payments for
health services. This increase is taking
place despite accumulating evidence about
the detrimental effect on both financial
protection and the welfare of citizens of
heavy reliance on user payments for fi-
nancing health systems (leading to growing
calls for the complete abolition of user fees
in health care) [3,6–8]. In this context,
service coverage and financial risk protec-
tion have been a primary topic of dis-
cussion at the WHO 64th World Health
Assembly, whose resolution recommends
that the matter be further debated at the
forthcoming session of the United Nations
General Assembly [9].
Financial protection should remain a
key objective of any health system. How-
ever, we argue that there is an urgent need
to develop indicators capable of providing
a broader picture of financial protection
for better health policy guidance, because
the harm caused by inadequate financial
protection in many parts of the world goes
well beyond that measured by convention-
al indicators. In this paper, we discuss the
shortcomings of conventional metrics and
make recommendations about how finan-
cial protection analyses can be undertaken
in a more rounded manner to better aid
policy making.
Conventional Indicators of
Financial Protection Have
Important Shortcomings
Conventional indicators of financial
protection assess whether people suffer
financial hardship in paying for health
services and are based on the notions of
‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘impoverishing’’
health care spending, which relate health
expenditures to some threshold in terms of
living standards (Box 1). These measures
have noteworthy limitations. Specifically,
catastrophic and impoverishing spending
metrics are constructed solely on the basis
of out-of-pocket medical expenditures
reported in surveys, thus ignoring the fact
that poorer individuals often cannot afford
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to use health services and therefore report
very low or no health spending. As a
result, these individuals will often be
included amongst those considered to be
protected against financial catastrophe.
Whilst the presence of cost barriers to
access may be broadly linked to concerns
about equity of access, it is also a crucial
indicator of financial protection in a health
system. In most societies, a person who is
unable to seek necessary care because its
costs exceed their capacity to pay would
not be considered financially protected. It
has been estimated that most of the 1.3
billion poor citizens around the world
have restricted access to health services
because of cost [4,10]. And the problem
is not confined to low-income countries
without effective public insurance sche-
mes. Recent survey data from high-
income countries have shown that around
one-third of US adults did not get
recommended care, did not see a doctor
when sick, or failed to fill/skipped pre-
scriptions because of costs, with very high
proportions also observed in countries
with de jure universal coverage such as
Germany (25%), Australia (22%), Canada
(15%), New Zealand (14%), and France
(13%) [11].
The World Health Report 2010 recom-
mended that financial protection indica-
tors based on household out-of-pocket
spending should be complemented with
information on de facto coverage levels for
some ‘‘key interventions,’’ so as to provide
‘‘clues on the extent to which financial
barriers prevent people from using servic-
es’’ [4] (p.10). This sensible suggestion
highlights the fact that current catastroph-
ic and impoverishing spending metrics are
unable to offer a complete picture of risk
protection levels. Worse still, we argue that
misleading policy conclusions can be
obtained by focusing solely on these
conventional measures.
Consider a simple illustration examin-
ing two health coverage indicators widely
used by international agencies: diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis (DTP3) immunization
and births attended by skilled personnel.
Figures 1 and 2 present comparisons of
catastrophic spending incidence and the
corresponding national coverage levels for
these interventions. The figures show that,
for a given level of financial catastrophe
incidence, there are remarkable discrep-
ancies in coverage levels, suggesting im-
portant differences also in the presence of
financial and other barriers to access
across health systems at least as far as
primary care is concerned. For example,
the estimated incidence of catastrophic
spending among households in Uganda
was 2.9% in 2003, a similar figure to that
estimated for countries such as Greece
(2.2%) and Portugal (3.0%) [6]. A sole
focus on reported catastrophic expendi-
tures could lead an observer to conclude
that citizens of Uganda enjoyed a similar
level of financial protection as their
counterparts in Greece and Portugal,
despite the much improved breadth (uni-
versality of health benefits) and depth
(lower cost-sharing) of coverage by public
health insurance schemes observed in the
two OECD countries [12]. In fact, empir-
ical evidence on barriers to health care use
in Uganda strongly suggests that a large
share of its population is not adequately
protected against the financial conse-
quences of illnesses (in many areas such
as obstetric and postnatal services, child
health, and curative care), having to forgo
necessary medical treatment because of
costs [13]. From Figure 1 we can see that
only about 59% of 1-year-olds were
immunized against DTP3 in Uganda,
compared to around 90% in Portugal
and Greece.
Such discrepancies in coverage and
access to care between countries with
similar catastrophic spending levels are
common even when comparisons are made
within groups of similar national income
per capita [14]. For instance, lower middle-
Summary Points
N Most health systems fail to offer adequate financial protection to citizens
because of insufficient financial risk pooling and prepayment mechanisms.
N The harm caused by inadequate financial protection goes well beyond that
measured by conventional indicators such as catastrophic and impoverishing
health spending.
N A broader set of metrics is required to better inform policy development on
financial protection, including new indicators that identify citizens who cannot
afford to use health services and may have very low or no health spending.
N Options include expanding the use of household surveys that assess cost
barriers to health care access and the calculation of ‘‘need-adjusted’’ estimates
of medical care utilization and spending.
Box 1. Glossary
Financial Protection Financial protection refers to how far people are
protected from the financial consequences of illness. A growing body of
research has focused on the extent to which health payments are catastrophic
or impoverishing. These financial protection indicators provide information on
the number of households spending a large proportion of their income on
medical bills, where ‘‘large’’ means that their health payments exceed some
threshold measured in terms of household income after subsistence costs such as
food and shelter have been met (catastrophic spending), or push households
below a predefined poverty line (impoverishing spending). The choice of
threshold above which health care payments are defined as catastrophic or
impoverishing is unavoidably arbitrary and ultimately a normative choice, varying
across studies [3,6,16].
Health System Financing The financing of most health systems include some
pooling arrangement, meaning that financial resources are accumulated and
managed so as to share the financial risks of illness across all members of the
pool. Thus, members of the pool who need to use health services will not have to
bear the corresponding costs all by themselves, as costs will be shared across all
pool members, making ill individuals less likely to be deterred from seeking care
because of health payments and less likely to fall into poverty should any
payments need to be made. Higher proportions of prepaid funds for health
care—that is, funds paid by individuals before the event of illness or injury,
through channels such as social health insurance contributions or taxes—are
likely to enhance financial protection by favoring effective spreading of financial
risk across all population groups [4]. On the other hand, financial protection will
tend to be poorer if out-of-pocket payments (also referred to as cost-sharing
or user fees) make up for a significant share of health funding: these are
payments made directly by individuals to health providers at the time medical
services are provided and include, for example, fees paid for consultations,
laboratory tests, hospital admissions, and drugs.
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income countries such as China, Ukraine,
Bolivia, and Indonesia have estimated
financial catastrophe incidence of about
4%. However, coverage figures for DTP3
immunization and the share of births
attended by skilled personnel tend to be
much higher in the former two countries
(Figures 1 and 2). Analogously, Tajikistan,
Kenya, and Nepal, three low-income
countries with catastrophic health spending
incidence between 3.5% and 4.3%, also
exhibit remarkable differences concerning
coverage of births attended by skilled
personnel (71%, 42%, and 9%, respective-
ly) and DTP3 immunization (82%, 73%,
and 65%).
Evidence from a study by Schoen and
colleagues shows that differential—and
substantial—impacts of financial barriers
to access are also present among richer
countries with very low estimated inci-
dence of financial catastrophe (0.5% or
less) [11]. It found that 33% and 25% of
individuals in the US and Germany
(respectively) reported having been de-
terred from seeking necessary health care
because of costs, against 10% in Sweden
and only 5% in the United Kingdom. This
finding suggests that citizens living in this
group of countries are not equally pro-
tected against the financial consequences
of medical needs, despite negligible levels
of catastrophic spending.
Financial Protection Measures:
Suggested Areas for
Development
There is an emerging consensus on the
need for practical alternatives to account
for the effect of cost barriers to health care
access in financial protection analyses
[3,4,6,15]. As explained above, one alter-
native to obtain a broader picture of
financial protection levels across and
within health systems would be to com-
plement conventional measures with in-
formation provided by de facto coverage
indicators. Taking this route has a number
of limitations, however. First, from a
purely practical viewpoint, the coverage
indicators available for such analyses may
vary considerably in quality across coun-
tries and often pertain to data on selected
primary care interventions (e.g., immuni-
zation rates) available from international
agencies. These indicators may be more
pertinent in low-income settings, posing
problems if the final goal is to make
international performance comparisons
across health systems. Second, coverage
indicators have limited scope by construc-
tion, offering little information on many
other potential dimensions of forgone care
(e.g., adherence to secondary prevention
medications) which may result in delayed
care and greater costs to individuals and
health care systems. Also, there is usually
scant information available at the national
level on utilization figures for more
complex outpatient and inpatient care—
often associated with important cost bar-
Figure 1. Catastrophic spending incidence and DTP3 immunization coverage among 1-year-olds, 87 countries (various years).
Catastrophic spending is defined as out-of-pocket payments for health reaching at least 40% of a household’s nonsubsistence income [6,26].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001087.g001
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riers to access and higher likelihood of
financial catastrophe [16,17]. Finally, any
analyses focusing on financial barriers to
health care utilization must account for
the fact that coverage measures can be
influenced by a number of other nonfi-
nancial factors such as cultural issues,
workforce shortages, and health system
planning [18,19].
Surveys containing questions on pat-
terns and reasons for foregone health care
utilization seem a more attractive—and
frequently feasible—alternative to comple-
ment the information from conventional
financial protection indicators. Standard-
ized, multipurpose surveys have been
applied in many countries and offer useful
data for financial protection assessments.
The Commonwealth Fund International
Health Policy Surveys, conducted in
various high-income countries, are a good
example [20]. They provide cross-country
information on the prevalence of financial
barriers to access, such as whether indi-
viduals have been deterred from using
health services or following the adequate
course of treatment because of costs.
Several middle- and low-income countries
already implement regular household sur-
veys containing questions about effective
access to care [21], and including such
questions into other national surveys
should not result in major additional data
collection costs. Moreover, a number of
household surveys containing access and
utilization questions have been conducted
in the past under WHO’s World Health
Survey project and the World Bank’s
Living Standards Measurement Study
[22,23]. The application of these surveys
on a routine basis to allow the monitoring
of the extent of financial (and other)
barriers to access across countries remains
an important challenge for timely, evi-
dence-based policy.
A methodologically different route
would be to attempt to incorporate the
effect of financial barriers to access directly
into the construction of financial protec-
tion metrics. In this regard, a small
number of studies have computed ‘‘need-
adjusted’’ figures of medical care utiliza-
tion and spending using survey data,
indicating the amount of medical care
individuals would have received had they
been treated as other individuals with
similar ‘‘health need’’ characteristics (i.e.,
observable factors such as age and gender)
were on average treated in the population
[10,16]. These studies indicate that policy
recommendations for achieving financial
protection may be very different when the
effect of financial barriers to access is
explicitly considered (Box 2).
Both alternatives discussed above have
methodological challenges of their own.
Multipurpose household or health surveys
with detailed medical spending informa-
tion have rarely been conducted in poorer
countries on a routine and relatively
standardized basis, making international
comparisons less straightforward. On the
Figure 2. Catastrophic spending incidence and percentage of births attended by skilled personnel, 79 countries (various years).
Catastrophic spending is defined as out-of-pocket payments for health reaching at least 40% of a household’s non-subsistence income [6,26].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001087.g002
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other hand, the usefulness of ‘‘need-
adjusted’’ health expenditures for policy-
making would depend, among other
factors, on an accepted (and operational)
definition of what ‘‘necessary medical
spending’’ means in any given context.
Finally, financial protection metrics should
ideally take other fundamental issues into
consideration, such as the long-term
financial consequences of strategies fre-
quently adopted by households to cope
with medical bills (e.g., borrowing money
or selling assets) [17].
Although tackling the obstacles to devel-
oping better methods of financial protection
assessment is far from trivial, the payoff in
terms of improved health policy-making
make it worth the challenge. Sound financial
protection analysis is crucial for correctly
identifying those individuals at greater risk of
falling into poverty or being deterred from
seeking necessary care because of health
payments. As such, it can provide valuable
information about the potentially harmful
effects of user charges in health care often
implemented by governments under financial
strain (including the distribution of their
impacts across population groups). Accurate
information from such analyses may also be
used to identify those health interventions
that should be given priority for public
funding, on the basis of their financial
protection benefits in addition to convention-
al resource allocation criteria such as cost-
effectiveness rankings [24,25].
Conclusions
Most health systems fail to offer ade-
quate financial protection to citizens. The
adverse consequences of inadequate finan-
cial risk protection in health are likely to
be understated in most national settings,
possibly to a considerable extent. This is
because conventional measures of finan-
cial protection (catastrophic and impover-
ishing health spending) provide no infor-
mation on those citizens who cannot
afford to use health services and have
low or no health expenditures. The use of
these conventional metrics in isolation as
guiding tools may result in erroneous
policy decisions. There is therefore a clear
and urgent need to develop better metrics
of the level of financial risk protection for
sound policy-making in health systems.
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